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COMMENT: JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCIPLINE
WENDELL L. GRIFFEN*
Professor Steven Lubet of Northwestern University School of Law correctly
observes that the primary point of friction between judicial independence and
accountability is at the state level.1  Federal judges are not immune from ac-
countability concerns, but those concerns are mitigated by the fact that federal
judges serve with life tenure and can be removed from office only by impeach-
ment.  We judges in state courts deal with accountability issues more frequently
and are more sensitive to them because we are only one election cycle away
from unemployment.  The judicial disciplinary process and the specter of politi-
cally motivated misconduct allegations against state judges poses another im-
portant challenge to judicial independence.
I view the issue of judicial independence and accountability on three inter-
dependent levels: political accountability, decisional accountability, and be-
havioral accountability.  Political accountability includes selection, tenure, and
the extent to which judges are accountable to the other branches of government
for appropriations, definition of jurisdiction, and other issues related to the
terms and conditions of our service in the judiciary.
Decisional accountability concerns the manner in which judges are held ac-
countable for rulings and decisions.  While this principally takes place through
appellate review, it also includes academic criticism of judicial actions.  How-
ever, I question the extent to which most state court judges are concerned
about academic reaction to their work.  Most voters, including the lawyers who
vote, do not read law review articles and case notes.  I do not know of any judi-
cial election campaigns that have featured scholarly reviews of a judge’s deci-
sions.  Thus, apart from appellate review, decisional accountability occurs
mainly in two sensitive places: legislative power to appropriate funding for the
courts being manipulated in response to unpopular decisions and rulings, and
media criticism of judicial decisions and rulings by politicians and at the grass-
roots level.
Behavioral accountability involves judicial conduct made the subject of dis-
ciplinary proceedings.  Although appellate review occasionally includes criti-
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cism of judicial behavior and, on rare occasions, has resulted in sanctions such
as reassignment of a case to another judge due to misbehavior, bias, or preju-
dice, judicial disciplinary proceedings outnumber these situations.
I am particularly concerned about the interplay between decisional and be-
havioral accountability in the context of judicial disciplinary proceedings.  For
example, Senator Robert Dole called for the impeachment of Judge Harold
Baer of the Southern District of New York after the judge suppressed evidence
of cocaine seized by New York City police officers.  The Clinton White House
suggested that Judge Baer’s resignation would be sought if he did not reverse
the ruling.  Naturally, Judge Baer reversed himself.  Similarly, former Justice
Penny White of the Tennessee Supreme Court faced virulent opposition fol-
lowing an opinion reversing a homicide conviction; the criticism resulted in her
defeat in a retention election.  Character assassination and demagoguery have
been targeted at judges who vote to overturn convictions in capital cases,
against judges who are viewed as “soft on crime,” against judges who are casti-
gated as either enemies of the unborn or a woman’s right to choose abortion,
and against judges who rule in favor of unpopular causes.  The attacks are
likely to intensify as more litigation is being shifted to state courts.
Judges are sitting ducks when attacked because of our decisions.  While
Judge Baer enjoyed life tenure, that did not preclude the possibility that he
could have been made the subject of a judicial disciplinary complaint.  Had
such a complaint been made, it would, one hopes, have been summarily dis-
missed because it involved a matter that was subject to appellate review.  Nev-
ertheless, Judge Baer would have been forced to spend personal funds, take
time away from his court duties, and suffer the distraction of press reports
about the pending complaint.
I agree, therefore, with Professor Lubet that the most serious threat to the
judicial independence of state court judges is the imposition or threat of sanc-
tions based on a judge’s decision.2  If the California Commission on Judicial
Performance files a formal charge against Justice Anthony Kline of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals based upon a dissenting opinion, Justice Kline could
potentially be removed from the bench for stating his good faith views about
the law.  Such a use of judicial disciplinary proceedings clearly poses the danger
that judges must yield to what Professor Lubet terms “a judicial orthodoxy.”3
State court judges have always been mindful of the potential for political
defeat due to public displeasure with our rulings and opinions.  Now we must
also contend with the prospect of defending ourselves in disciplinary proceed-
ings based on allegations that our rulings and opinions demonstrate misconduct
in office.  Nothing prevents a political officeholder, political opponent, interest
group, or disgruntled litigant from filing such charges.  When and if they are
filed, the targeted judges must finance their defenses with personal funds.  They
cannot engage in fundraising efforts to underwrite the cost of defending their
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conduct.  Additionally, the fact that charges are pending against a judge can be
used in campaign material by opponents or in retention elections.  If I may ap-
propriate the marvelous metaphor used by the late Justice Otto Kaus of the
California Supreme Court (mentioned by Professor Gerald Uelmen in his arti-
cle on maintaining the independence of state supreme courts in an era of judi-
cial politization4), the specter of judicial disciplinary proceedings arising from
decisional conduct is another “crocodile in the bathtub” that is hard not to
think about as we state judges shave or put on our makeup.  It is even harder
not to think about when one realizes that one must take a shower or bath.  For
sitting ducks, crocodiles in the bathtub are more than causes for intellectual re-
flection.
I am now reading two powerful books: Taylor Branch’s Pillar of Fire, the
second part of his trilogy on the civil rights era during the King years, and Juan
William’s Thurgood Marshall: American Revolutionary.  One striking feature in
both books is that although state court judges had the first opportunities to
provide relief for civil rights violations, they almost never granted relief.  What
comes through these works is a picture of state court judges who were timid,
unimaginative, and, in some instances, even disdainful of the arguments put
forward by those who attacked racial segregation in our nation.  If the fear of
electoral defeat alone can produce such timidity, I cannot pretend that the
prospect of being charged with misconduct and forced to finance one’s defense
will not add to it.  I do not summarily dismiss the notion that judicial discipli-
nary proceedings will become the favored stalking ground against judges who
render unpopular decisions.
It is time to provide public financing for the defense of judicial misconduct
allegations based on decisions and opinions.  Instead of employing counsel at
their own expense, judges should be reimbursed from state funds, particularly
when judges are exonerated or when the complaints are dismissed as improp-
erly lodged.  We must put our money behind our rhetoric about judicial inde-
pendence.  I hope that this symposium can be a starting point in that process,
and I appreciate the opportunity the symposium presents for such an appeal.
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